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Abstract
This paper investigates whether the Chilean financial reforms of the 1980s have
contributed to reducing market imperfections in Chilean capital markets in the
late 1980 and early 1990s. To analyse this issue, patterns of investment and its
finance for different types of firms is studied, based on balance sheet
information of a panel of 70 firms. The general conclusion is that it remains
difficult to find evidence for the fact that reforms did improve access of small
and young firms to outside finance, indicating that market imperfections may
still be prevalent. The results also show that those specific reforms, which aimed
at reducing intra-conglomerate lending, seem to have been successful, since
access of non-conglomerate firms has increased, indicating a reduction of
existing market imperfections for these firms.
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Chile experienced a deep economic and financial crisis during the early 1980s.
Real GDP fell by 16 per cent from 1981 to 1983 (Banco Central de Chile, 1990,
p.58). Saving and investment plummeted, and real activity in several economic
sectors reduced dramatically, especially in the manufacturing, construction and
financial sectors. As a reaction to the crisis, the Chilean government introduced a
series of reforms to regain the dynamic process of economic growth of the
1970s. With respect to the financial sector the government undertook several
measures to try to enhance the process of financial intermediation. These
measures aimed at improving resource mobilisation and the efficiency of
investment. According to the Chilean policy makers, the improvement of both
these aspects would contribute to higher economic growth.
An important element of the financial reform programme was the new
regulation of the banking sector. The new regulation aimed at contributing to
increased financial stability and to reduced market imperfections by encouraging
monitoring and screening activities of market participants to reduce problems of
information. The process of strengthening the banking system culminated in the
presentation of the new banking law of 1986, which was directed towards
improving the framework of prudential regulation. The new banking law was
introduced as a reaction to the adverse experiences of weak regulation during the
1970s and early 1980s.
This paper aims at evaluating the contribution of the financial reform
programme to reduce market imperfections in financial markets. It tries to
analyse the impact of the reforms on investment and its finance of the Chilean
business sector during 1983-1992. The approach taken is based on recent
theoretical and empirical work, in which it is pointed out that information
problems in capital markets have an important impact on how firms finance their
investment plans. In particular, it has been pointed out that if these information
problems do play a role, then internal sources should be positively related to
fluctuations in investment outlays. Much of the empirical work on this issue
concentrates on the importance of information problems in developed countries.
1Only very few papers have been published in which the issue is analysed for
developing countries. This paper tries to make a contribution to this literature.
The analysis follows techniques used in the existing empirical literature with
respect to investigating the extent of information problems in capital markets.
The investigation makes use of balance sheet data of a set of 70 Chilean firms
for which information is available during 1982-1992. First, different groups of
firms are distinguished for which there exist differences in the extent of these
information problems. In the analysis in this paper firms are distinguished
according to their size, age and relatedness to a business conglomerate. Second,
investment behaviour of different groups of firms is compared. The econometric
investigation focuses on the issue of whether internal sources of finance are
more important in determining investment patterns of firms for which
information problems in capital markets are perceived as being more pressing,
which would adversely affect their access to loans.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the main
macroeconomic and financial reforms during the 1980s and early 1990s. Section
3 provides a theoretical background for the relationship between investment and
its finance and discusses relevant empirical work. Section 4 describes the data
used in the econometric analysis. Section 5 presents the results of the
econometric investigation of the impact of the financial reform programme on
investment and its finance of different groups of firms. Section 6 provides a
summary and conclusion.
2. Macroeconomic and Financial Reforms
2.1 The Macroeconomic Setting, 1974-1992
The 1980s and early 1990s have been quite a hectic period for the Chilean
economy. During the early 1980s the country experienced the most severe
recession since the 1930s. The economy contracted by 15 per cent during
1982-1983, and the official unemployment rate rose to 20 per cent in 1982
(Corbo and Fischer, 1994, pp.32-33). Production in several sectors of the
2economy fell dramatically. In manufacturing sector output shrank by 18.5 per
cent from 1981 to 1983. In the construction and financial sector, output
reduction during this period amounted to 34.5 per cent and 43.1 per cent
respectively (Banco Central de Chile, 1990, p.58).
This severe contraction of the economy came after a period of relatively
successful economic change. From 1974, after Allende had been overthrown by
the military junta, the new Chilean government implemented a rigorous change
of economic policy by carrying out a programme of economic stabilisation and
structural adjustment. Various market reforms were introduced, including real
and financial market liberalisations, labour market reforms, trade liberalisations,
the liberalisation of the capital account and massive privatisation of public
enterprises. This neo-liberal approach diverged importantly from what had been
the system of economic organisation from the 1940s to the 1970s, when the state
was the driving force behind economic development.
Initially, the economic stabilisation programme deepened the economic
recession, basically because the government carried out restrictive monetary and
fiscal policies. Yet, during 1976-1981 the economic policies seemed to be
working. The annual average economic growth rate amounted to 8 per cent
during 1977-1981, which was relatively high, even by international standards.
1
Economic success was not achieved on all fronts, however. Unemployment did
not fall substantially from its 1975 level. Moreover, with respect to the external
sector, Chile developed an increasing trade balance deficit from 1977, since the
value of exports grew much slower than imports. The exchange rate policy -
which until 1979 aimed at using a crawling peg system to break expectations of
high inflation and thereafter was turned into a system of fixing the peso to the
dollar - led to an increasingly overvalued real exchange rate. This, in
combination with trade liberalisation, made imports both cheap and easy to
access. The high level of imports fueled a consumption boom, financed to a
large extent by foreign borrowing. This contributed to a rising current account
deficit.
1 The annual average growth rate for Latin America during this period was only 4 per cent,
whereas it reached 7 per cent for the East Asian countries (World Bank, 1991, pp.22-25).
3The crisis of 1982-1983 was caused by the conjunction of domestic policies
implemented during the 1970s and the adverse external developments of the
early 1980s. On the one hand by external factors, such as falling terms of trade,
world wide economic crisis, rising international interest rates and the sudden fall
in external finance after the Mexican debt moratorium of August 1982 had an
important adverse impact on the Chilean economy. On the other hand, domestic
policies were also important. First, the adverse impact of the exchange rate
policy on the external balance has already been described. Second, the policy of
wage indexation gave Chilean producers a price disadvantage with respect to
their external competitors, increasingly weakening their economic position.
Third, the high indebtedness of both consumers and industrial sectors - which
was a direct consequence of the financial liberalisation in combination with the
regulation of the financial sector -, led to an increasingly weak financial position
of both firms and banks, ending in a deep financial crisis. Finally, the situation
of economic crisis was greatly enforced when in June 1982 the policy of fixing
the peso to the dollar was finally given up and the government announced a
considerable devaluation of the national currency. This policy added to the
financial problems of many firms and consequently also banks, especially in
those case where they had large debts, which were denominated in dollars.
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During the next two years, the economy only slowly recovered from the
severity of the crisis. The Chilean government was muddling through without a
clear picture of what should be done to overcome the economic recession. The
crisis led to serious doubts about the neo-liberal approach to economic policy
within the government in 1984. For a short period of time policies changed to
activate the domestic economy, leading to a re-introduction of protectionist
measures, a policy of industrial targeting, together with Keynesian-type
government expenditure increases. From 1985, however, the government
returned to a neo-liberal policy of stabilisation and structural transformation.
2 Useful descriptions of the economic liberalisation programme implemented in Chile during
the 1970s and early 1980s, as well as analyses of its consequences and failures can be found in,
among others, Vittorio Corbo (1985), Sebastian Edwards and Alejandra Cox Edwards (1991),
Alejandro Foxley (1983), Cristian Moran (1989) and Joseph Ramos (1986).
4The neo-liberal policies after 1985 were different from those carried out in
the 1970s, however. The policies of the 1970s took the approach that
macroeconomic problems would adjust on their own (Cox Edwards and
Edwards, 1992, p.207). During the 1980s, the Chilean government actively used
monetary and fiscal policy to stabilise and adjust the economic process. In
particular, the government used policies to control the growth of domestic credit
to target the real interest rate to avoid the experiences of the excessively high
real interest rates during the 1970s. Additionally, it used an active exchange rate
policy. Regular devaluations were made, which took into account the domestic
inflation and domestic and external macroeconomic developments that were of
influence on the (expected) real exchange rate (Edwards and Cox Edwards,
1991, pp.216-218). Moreover, the government redirected its expenditures from
consumption towards investment. Finally, several reforms were implemented,
which aimed at stimulating and diversifying exports, reducing the outstanding
external debt and increasing domestic resource mobilisation. From 1986,
economic growth resumed and remained fairly strong for the next seven years.
2.2 Financial Reforms
The years 1982-1983 were especially critical for the financial sector. Due to the
very weak position of firms - in many cases leading to their bankruptcy
3 -
several banks met with considerable financial problems. Most observers now
agree that the combination of weak prudential regulation and the dominance of
business conglomerates in the Chilean economy has been an important factor
behind the domestic financial instability during the early 1980s (Edwards and
Cox-Edwards, 1991; Velasco, 1991; Hermes, 1995; Visser and Van Herpt,
1996).
4 The central bank had to intervene in order to prevent a complete
financial breakdown. In early 1983 the central bank decided to intervene by
3 The number of bankruptcies increased from 131 in 1976 to 431 in 1981. Most firms went
bankrupt in 1982, however, when their number rose to 810 (Mizala, 1985, pp.61-62).
4 The details of the events related to this issue are beyond the scope of this paper. See De la
Cuadra and Valdés (1992
a) and Hermes (1995) for more indepth analyses of the facts that led to
the financial instability in the early 1980.
5taking over non-performing debts of banks with severe financial problems and
by liquidating insolvent institutions. Together with earlier interventions in the
financial system during 1981, the central bank intervened in thirteen banks and
six financieras. Eight of these banks and all six financieras were liquidated. The
others were technically taken over by the central bank. Among the latter were
the two largest banks of the country. The loan portfolio of the intervened
institutions represented 60 per cent of all loans issued by the financial system
(Larraín, 1989, pp.1-2). Moreover, to reduce the crisis of confidence, the
government issued an explicit deposit insurance on deposits held with insolvent
intermediaries.
As a reaction to the problems in the domestic financial markets, the Chilean
government decided to strengthen the regulatory system.
5 In 1986, the monetary
authorities introduced a new banking law. This new law contained the most
important financial reforms of the 1980s. This new banking law was preceded by
several financial reforms during 1981-1982. The banking law, together with
these new measures, were directed at preventing the financial sector from
collapsing in the future. Moreover, they aimed at improving the process of
domestic resource mobilisation and the efficiency of resource allocation. The
most important elements these reforms contained are described briefly below.
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Strengthening the regulation of asset and liability management of banks
- Restrictions on lending to individual borrowers of banks. The definition of an
individual borrower includes firms in which the borrower has an important
share of total equity.
5 The financial reforms described below only refer to new regulation to enforce the system of
supervision. Note, however, that during the 1980s the Chilean government also introduced other
major reforms with respect to the financial system. In particular, it privatised the pension fund
system in 1981, which was an important stimulus to increased domestic savings and of trading in
new securities markets. The issue of the privatisation of the pension funds and its effects on
financial sector development is beyond the scope of this paper, however. See Diamond and Valdés
(1994) for a review of the development of the pension fund system in the 1980s.
6 For a more detailed description of the contents of the Chilean financial reforms, see Ramírez
(1991), Ramírez and Rosende (1992), and De la Cuadra and Valdès (1992
b).
6- Restrictions on lending to related parties of the bank, i.e. its shareholders and
employees.
- Loan classification system: banks have to report details of 85 per cent of their
loan portfolio outstanding or of their 400 largest borrowers.
- Strengthening capital requirements.
- Regulations to reduce the risks of maturity mismatching.
- Restrictions on share of interbank loans to total liabilities.
Disclosure of financial information to the public
- Banks have to report details of their activities in a national newspaper four
times a year. This should include information on their income statement and
balance sheet, and specific information on issues like the extent of asset and
liability mismatch and lending to related parties of the bank. Additionally, the
report of the external auditing company should also be published.
- The Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras (SBIF) - the
regulatory institution supervising the banking sector - publishes its own
assessment of periodical evaluations of bank solvency.
Explicit deposit insurance
- Under the new banking law the deposit insurance scheme discriminates
between money and other bank liabilities. Money liabilities are defined as
liabilities termed for a maximum of less than 30 days or liabilities contracted
for 30 days or more but expiring within the next ten days. All money liabilities
are 100 per cent insured.
- For all other liabilities only small deposit holders are insured.
New mechanisms for dealing with solvency problems of banks
The approach taken by the Chilean regulatory authorities is to privatise bank
losses. This approach requires that the public is convinced that the central bank
will not intervene when bank failures occur, with the exception of holders of
money liabilities and/or small deposit holders. This requires explicit rules
indicating what will happen in the event of a bank failure. In case of bank
7insolvency several adjustment mechanisms are defined:
- Recapitalisation proposal with creditors, submitted by the failing bank’s board,
which ensures that the liabilities of the insolvent bank are reshaped so that the
bank becomes solvent again. This proposal may include:
* total or partial capitalisation of bank liabilities;
* extension of nonpreferential debt;
* partial debt foregiveness;
* other forms of reshaping debt payments between the bank and its creditors.
This recapitalisation proposal may be rejected by the creditors of the bank after
which a second round starts in which the bank management submits a new
proposal. If this second proposal is also rejected by the bank’s creditors, the
central bank will put the insolvent bank under mandatory liquidation.
- Financial help from other banks by granting subordinate loans to failing banks.
The measures implemented before 1983 basically aimed at reducing the
possibilities of intra-conglomerate lending. This kind of lending was held
responsible, at least to a large extent, for the growing financial instability during
the early 1980s. In fact, these measures prohibited banks from being the
financial heart of these conglomerates, a position they had obtained in the course
of the 1970s.
The new Chilean banking law of 1986, which contained the bulk of the
above described reforms, explicitly aimed at improving financial intermediation
by increasing the confidence of the public in the system as well as by improving
the quality of bank management. In general terms, the newly developed
regulatory system obliged banks to act risk-aversely, whereas at the same time
the public was stimulated to closely monitor bank behaviour with only minor
government involvement. The basic idea was that by improving financial market
regulation as described above information-based market imperfections would be
reduced by stimulating both deposit holders and banks to increase their
monitoring and screening activities. Increasing public confidence by improving
prudential regulation and by providing deposit holders clear incentives and
possibilities to privately monitor and screen banking operations would contribute
8to a safer and more efficient banking system, which would enhance resource
mobilisation. This would increase the volume of resources available for
investment. Moreover, better monitoring and screening by the management of
the bank - to which management is obliged within the new banking law - would
improve the quality of investment financed by banks. Increased production of
information with respect to activities related to financial markets by both
creditors of the banks as well as the banks themselves would contribute to
reducing market segmentation and high-risk lending operations.
3. Investment and Financial Constraints
In a world with perfect markets, investment of firms may be financed both from
internal and external of finance. Internal finance consists of net profits plus
depreciation (i.e. cash flow), whereas external finance may come from various
sources of borrowing in financial markets. According to the neo-classical theory
of corporate investment behaviour - developed by Franco Modigliani and Merton
Miller (1958) - with financial markets being perfect firms will be indifferent
with regard to financing investment with internal or external funds. Internal and
external finance are perfect substitutes, which means that investment is not
constrained by the availability of funds. Firms will invest until the marginal cost
of borrowing - which is proxied by the risk-free market interest rate - is equal to
the expected marginal rate of return on the investment project.
However, from existing theoretical literature it is well-known by now that
financial markets are normally characterised by imperfections related to
information problems, such as monitoring and screening problems and problems
of asymmetric information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Under these circumstances the
Modigliani-Miller proposition no longer holds. It then follows that it does make
a difference whether a firm finances its investment with external or internal
funds, since, the cost of external finance will be above that of internal finance
due to the additional costs of information. The borrower has to pay a premium
9above the risk-free market interest rate to cover for these information costs. In
some cases, borrowers are even excluded from external finance, in which case
credit rationing applies, due to the fact that the information problem is too large
and the related information costs are too high. The larger the information
problems related to lending to particular (classes of) firms, the higher the interest
rate premium, and the higher the possibility of full credit rationing. Stated
somewhat differently, financial constraints may become important, especially for
those borrowers having problems to communicate their private information to
financial intermediaries and/or investors.
If financial constraints are important, this may influence investment
behaviour of firms. Since some categories of firms have more problems in
attaining external finance, based on the fact that they more difficluties in
communicating their information to lenders, fluctuations in investment spending
of these categories of firms will be more closely linked to changes in the
availability of internal funds. They may even have to forego potentially good
investment projects due to financial constraints. Based on the above theoretical
framework, it is expected that levels of annual investment outlays are positively
related to measures of internal sources, such as cash flow.
Within this framework, it is possible to investigate whether or not the
financial reforms in Chile during the 1980s contributed to reducing existing
market imperfections. The remainder of this paper investigates the impact of the
above described financial reforms related to strengthening the regulation of the
banking system on the financial decision making of firms during the 1980s and
early 1990s. The hypothesis is that if the financial reforms have had the
expected outcomes, then market imperfections in the financial sector should have
reduced, at least from 1987 after that all major reforms had been implemented.
This is based on the idea that before the reforms banks were less able to screen
and monitor the projects with the highest expected rate of return, due to
externalities related to screening and monitoring borrowers by these banks, and
based on the high cost of gathering information. Consequently, they restricted
their lending activities to particular groups of borrowers and rationed other
groups, due to asymmetric information. After the reforms, monitoring and
10screening is expected to have been improved and problems of asymmetric
information to have been reduced, which may expose itself mainly through
decreased segmentation of access to loans of different categories of firms. By
considering changes in the relationship between investment and internal sources
of firms in the 1983-1992 period, indirect evidence may be provided with
respect to whether or not these expected effects did take place.
In recent years, a large body of empirical literature has investigated the issue
of information problems in financial markets and their impact on investment
decisions of firms in developed countries (see, among others, Fazzari, Hubbard
and Petersen, 1988; Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Hoshi, Kashyap and
Scharfstein, 1991; Whited, 1992; Van Ees and Garretsen, 1994; and Chirinko
and Schaller, 1995). These studies analyse the importance of measures of
internal funds or liquidity as an explanatory variable of annual investment
outlays. The empirical studies approach this issue by dividing firms into groups
for which it might be expected that information problems are more severe as
compared to other groups of firms. Next, they compare the impact of internal
funds on investment between these different groups of firms to see whether there
is evidence for the hypothesis that measures of internal funds are less important
as determinants of investment of firms for which banks may hold more
information. In general, these studies find empirical support for this hypothesis.
Analyses of differences in access to external finance to analyse financial
market imperfections as described above have been scarcely applied to the cases
of developing countries. One of the very few studies comes from Izak Atiyas
(1992), who has used this methodology to analyse the impact of the financial
reforms on credit constraints for small versus large firms in the case of Korea
during the 1980s. His findings show that small firms are finance constrained
during the early 1980s but these constraints are reduced in the late 1980s, as is
suggested by the fact that the coefficient of a stock measure of liquidity drops in
investment equations for these firms. For large firms the coefficient of the
internal funds variable rises, which may be explained by the fact that after the
liberalisations of the mid-1980s the Korean government significantly reduced its
programmes for targeted credits. Before the liberalisation these targeted credits
11were more directed towards large firms. After the liberalisation new targeted
credit programmes were introduced, this time focusing on financing smaller
firms.
Studies from John Harris, Fabio Schiantarelli and Miranda Siregar (1994),
and Siregar (1995) investigate the issue of the impact of financial liberalisation
on reducing information problems in the case of Indonesia in the 1980s. Both
these studies do find support for the hypothesis that the Indonesian programme
of financial liberalisation of 1983 has reduced the reliance of informationally
disadvantaged firms on internal funds when they invest. In other words, they
suggest that the degree of market segmentation has reduced after the reforms.
The present study extends the existing scarce empirical literature on
developing countries by studying the issue of whether or not the financial
reforms of the 1980s in Chile have changed the impact of financial market
imperfections on investment and its finance.
4. Data Description
To analyse the hypothesis that in the presence of information problems in
financial markets internal funds are more relevant in determining investment of
some classes of firms as compared to other classes of firms, financial data have
been used on a firm level. These data have been provided by the
Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS), a government agency to which
limited companies have to report their activities on a quarterly base since 1981.
For the present analysis annual data have been used. The data set consists of
information on balance sheets, income statements and uses and sources of funds
of firms from different sectors of the economy. These data are available for the
1980-1992 period.
7 For every year between 1981 and 1992 some 250 to 300
firms have reported information to the SVS.
The following criteria have been adopted to construct the data set which has
7 Before 1981 not only limited companies reported to the SVS.
12been used in the empirical part of this paper. First, firms have been selected that
presented full information for all relevant variables during the 1982-1992 period
in order to acquire a balanced data set. Second, firms have been eliminated from
the data set when they were operating within the financial, public administration
or social sectors. In other words, the firms in the data set are engaged in the
agricultural, mining, manufacturing, construction, or services sector. Using these
two criteria did leave 81 firms in the data set. After eliminating those firms
reporting that they were in a state of liquidation, or for which data appeared to
be unacceptable or inconsistent (such as reporting zero sales, and unacceptable
large changes in fixed and total assets), 70 firms remained, of which financial
data have been used in the estimations presented below. It is acknowledged that
the data set used in this study is not necessarily representative of the corporate
sector in Chile. It consists of relatively larger firms, which may have better
access to capital markets than the average Chilean firm. Any results from the
present research project must therefore be appreciated as indicative only.
Firms have been divided into subsamples based on criteria which may be
useful to identify firms that have different degrees of problems with
communicating private information to financial intermediaries, i.e. banks. Stated
differently, these criteria may distinguish those firms for which banks have
difficulties to monitor and screen their behaviour. The criteria that have been
used in this context are the size of firms, the age of firms, and whether or not a
firm belongs to a business conglomerate, or Grupo.
First, with respect to the size criterion, it is clear that banks have less
difficulty in screening and monitoring the behaviour of large firms, since the
monitoring and screening costs related to lending to such firms are lower per
unit of capital. This is due to the fixed cost nature of information and due to the
fact that the volume of lending to these firms will generally be larger in absolute
terms. Moreover, large firms are better able to provide collateral as compared to
small firms.
Second, with respect to the age criterion, it can be stated that old firms have
less difficulty in communicating private information, since banks will have had
more time to obtain information on their creditworthiness. Moreover, old firms
13have shown to be creditworthy and willing to pay back their obligations in the
past (Chirinko and Schaller, 1995, p.529).
Finally, firms related to a Grupo have less difficulties in communicating
information to banks. The Chilean Grupos are characterised by the fact that close
relationships exist between firms and banks within these conglomerates (Hermes
and Lensink, 1996). The existence of such close financial networks can be found
in many developing countries and can be explained on the grounds of existing
market failures, which appear to be prevalent in these countries (Stiglitz, 1989).
Close relationships between banks and firms mitigate information problems.
Banks are much better informed about the creditworthiness and the expected
profitability of investment of Grupo related firms. This improves the access of
these firms to bank loans.
Based on the above discussion of the criteria, it may become clear that small
firms, young firms, and firms not belonging to Grupos have more problems to
communicate information to banks. Banks have more difficulties to monitor and
screen their activities. The result is that these firms face higher costs of external
finance, and may even be rationed out of credit markets. Thus, they are more
likely to be faced by financial constraints.
For each of the three above mentioned criteria two sub-samples of firms
have been created: small versus large firms, young versus old firms and Grupo
versus non-Grupo firms. The size sub-samples have been obtained by dividing
the total sample of firms in two groups containing an equal number of firms,
based on average total assets during 1983-1992. The age sub-samples have been
obtained by classifying firms born less than 21 years ago as being young,
whereas firms of 21 years or older have been classified as old.
8 This gives 50
old and 20 young firms. Finally, the division of firms into Grupo and non-Grupo
firms is based on information provided by the SVS data. Among the information
in the data set is also a reference to whether or not a firm belongs to a Grupo. If
8 One may question whether this really divides informationally disadvantaged younger firms
from better known older firms. Yet, since only few firms are really young, i.e. for instance less
than 10 years old, the cut-off point has been set at 20 years to obtain a sufficient number of firms
within the sample of young firms.
14this reference is applied to the set of 70 firms, 38 firms are classified as non-
Grupo related firms, whereas 32 firms are classified as Grupo related firms.
Table 1 provides basic information on the characteristics of the sub-samples
of firms. In general, the summary statistics presented in the table do show that
different sub-samples of firms differ in a number of ways. First, large firms are
much larger than small firms. Based on median values of total assets, large firms
are seven times larger than small firms. Based on median values of fixed assets
this is even more than eleven times. Note that Grupo related firms are also much
larger than non-Grupo related firms, although the differences between both these
sub-samples are less striking than for the sub-samples based on size. In terms of
total assets, the median value of Grupo related firms is four and a half times that
of non-Grupo related firms. For the stock of fixed assets this is more than six
times. The difference in size between young and old firms is less pronounced.
Although mean values of both total and fixed assets of old firms are roughly two
times larger that of young firms, median values do not differ substantially.
Second, differences with respect to investment activity are not very large
between sub-samples. Mean values of investment to capital ratios for all sub-
samples amount vary around a level of 0.12. Third, small firms as well as non-
Grupo firms are less profitable than large and Grupo firms, respectively. For
sub-samples based on age, it appears to be more difficult to determine which
class of firms has been more profitable. Mean values of profit to total asset
ratios are higher for young firms. Yet, mean values seem to be rather volatile
over the 1983-1992 period (measured by its standard deviation). Therefore,
median values may be a better representation of the center of both sub-samples.
When looking at median values, it appears that old firms are more profitable.
Fourth, with respect to sales to asset rates, small firms, old firms and non-Grupo
firms have substantially higher mean and median values.
Finally, small firms, young firms and non-Grupo firms seem to have higher
internal sources (divided by the capital stock) available. Yet, the annual amount
of these internal sources appears to be rather volatile for all sub-samples (again
measured by its standard deviation) in the table. Therefore, taking median values
as a better representation of the center of sub-samples, the table shows that these
15values for large, old and Grupo firms are above those for small, young and non-
Grupo firms.
These summary statistics reveal interesting differences between different sub-
samples of firms for a number of variables of interest for the issue discussed in
this paper. Yet, econometric analysis is needed to really investigate whether the
relationship between investment and the availability of internal sources differs
for both groups of firms. By looking at the summary statistics in table 1, one can
only compare the relevant variables for different sub-samples of firms
unconditionally (i.e. not taking into account other specific features of these sub-
samples).










mean 2,519 948 0.121 0.049 0.978 0.431
median 2,041 580 0.082 0.056 0.632 0.184
LARGE
mean 38,004 19,856 0.117 0.083 0.567 0.267
median 15,377 6,652 0.089 0.084 0.509 0.207
YOUNG
mean 13,116 6,804 0.124 0.079 0.527 0.567
median 5,548 1,768 0.083 0.126 0.519 0.174
OLD
mean 23,830 12,220 0.117 0.062 0.862 0.258
median 5,977 2,241 0.087 0.143 0.586 0.204
NON-GRUPOS
mean 5,702 2,579 0.117 0.051 0.989 0.393
median 2,876 731 0.077 0.058 0.747 0.188
GRUPOS
mean 38,660 20,283 0.122 0.085 0.503 0.291
median 12,935 4,575 0.093 0.086 0.457 0.207
Note: total and fixed assets are in millions of 1985 pesos; investment and internal sources are divided
by the capital stock; profit and sales are divided by total assets.
165. Econometric Investigation
5.1 The Strategy of Econometric Investigation
In order to investigate whether some classes of firms are confronted with
stronger information problems in capital markets - which may reveal itself by
smaller sensitivity of investment outlays to the availability of internal sources for
large, old and Grupo firms as compared to small, young and non-Grupo firms -
an investment function has to be specified in which proxies for internal sources
are incorporated, next to other variables explaining investment behaviour. If the
size, age or relatedness to a Grupo reduces information imperfections, this
should expose itself by the fact that the coefficient for the internal sources
variable in the investment equation is lower for large, old and Grupo firms than
the coefficient for the small, young and non-Grupo firms.
9 Such an investigation
is the first step in the process of analysing the central hypothesis of this paper,
i.e. did the financial reforms in Chile in the 1980s contribute to reduce existing
market imperfections based on information problems in capital markets?
The second step establishes the effect of the reforms on existing market
imperfections. To investigate whether there is evidence for the hypothesis that
financial reforms succeeded in reducing these imperfections, the same investment
equation is estimated for sub-samples and sub-periods. In the estimations a pre-
reform and post-reform period are distinguished. The dividing line for
determining the pre- and post-reform periods has been set at the year 1987. The
rationale for choosing 1987 is based on the following considerations. First, the
major reforms were carried out during the 1981-1986 period. Second, these
reforms need at least one year to materialise and to have the desired effects on
the behaviour of participants in the financial markets. Both banks and firms need
time to adjust their financial and real decisions to the new conditions created by
the institutional reforms. The hypothesis specified above is said to be supported
if the coefficient for the internal funds variable in the investment equations for
9 As was mentioned earlier, this method for investigating informational imperfections in
financial markets is fairly standard in recent empirical work.
17the small firms, young firms and non-Grupo firms - i.e. those confronted with
more severe financial constraints, at least before the reforms - is higher for the
pre-reform than for the post-reform period. This would suggest that the reforms
have contributed to reduce information problems in capital markets, since those
firms identified as being confronted with more severe financial constraints before
the reforms would show reduced importance of internal sources to explain
investment, i.e. financial constraints have been reduced.
The econometric analysis is carried out as follows. An investment equation
is estimated for the 1983-1992 period. The dependent variable is gross
investment, i.e. net investment plus depreciation in each year. The estimation
procedure is based on pooled regressions of individual firm data, using the least
squares technique.
10 All variables (dependent as well as independent) in the
regressions presented below have been scaled by total capital stock one period
lagged and have then been transformed into logs.
11 In order to be able to pool
the information of individual firms, the fixed effects technique has been used.
This technique assumes that the intercepts of individual firms differ, yet the
slope coefficients are the same for all firms. To carry out fixed-effect
estimations, the original data have been transformed. For each variable, the
means of individual firm observations have been subtracted from the original
observations. The least-squares method is then been applied to the transformed
data (Hsiao, 1986, pp.29-41). In the estimation procedure, outliers have been
skipped based on extreme values of the residuals of the individual equations.
12
10 In some of the recent empirical work cited earlier the Generalised Method of Moments
(GMM) has been applied to analyse balance sheet data from a large number of firms. Although
this method may be preferred, since it uses the data more efficiently as compared to the fixed
effects technique, GMM has not been applied here due to the fact that it is only useful when large
data bases (i.e. data for more than 150-200 firms) are available.
11 Note that this introduces a minor bias in the data, since this leaves out observations having
zero or negative values.
12 Only a few observations have been deleted from the data based on this procedure.
185.2 Specification of the Investment Equations
In the estimations an accelerator-type investment model has been used as the
basic model for specification of the investment equations. This model is fairly
standard in investment literature. It incorporates changes in total sales (D SAL)
as the basic regressor which may explain investment behaviour. The idea is that
investment decisions are based on observed patterns of past demand for final
output. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected to be found between
investment and the sales variable. Other regressors which have been added to the
basic model are the debt to capital (or leverage) ratio (DEBT), investment one
period lagged (GINV), cash flow (CF), and Tobin’s Q (TOBQ). The debt to
capital ratio has been included to account for the effects of the cost of debt on
investment. Investment outlays will be negatively affected by this ratio, since the
higher the leverage, the higher will be the costs of financing investment with
debt. This is due to the fact that creditors will increase the marginal price of
loans when a debtor already has a high level of debt to capital (Harris,
Schiantarelli and Siregar, 1994, p.38). One should expect to find a negative
relationship between investment and the debt indicator. Investment one period
lagged is included to account for the stock adjustment process. It is hypothesised
that the relationship between investment and investment one period lagged is
positive.
Next, cash flow (net profit after taxes plus depreciation) has been added as a
measure of internal sources. This is standard in the empirical literature related to
the issue of this paper. Based on the discussion in section 3, one should expect
to find a positive relationship between investment and cash flow. However, the
coefficient of the cash flow variable should be lower for firms for which the
information problem in capital markets is assumed to be smaller, i.e. large firms,
old firms and Grupo firms.
Finally, Tobin’s Q has been added, since standard criticism of analysing the
relationship between investment and measures of internal sources has pointed out
that these measures may also proxy for the profitability of investment. According
to this criticism, one should expect there to be positive relationship between
internal sources and investment, since firms having more liquidity are doing well
19and thus have better possibilities to invest (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein,
1991, p.43). This may pose problems when one wants to interprete the cash flow
coefficients in terms of representing capital market imperfections. Therefore, one
can use Tobin’s Q (TOBQ) - a frequently used proxy measure for expected
profitability of the firm -, to account for the effect of the expected future
profitability of investment on investment decisions.
13 There are several ways of
measuring this variable. Tobin’s Q is defined here as the market value of equity
plus the book value of (short plus long-term) debt divided by the book value of
total assets. The relationship between investment and Tobin’s Q is expected to
be positive.
The exact specification of investment behaviour can be found in table 2,
equations [1]-[4]. All equations includes changes in total sales of the present
period. All other variables are included with a lag of one period.
14 Cash flow is
added one period lagged, based on the idea that in general a firm will finance
investment in period t, using the cash flow which is generated one period earlier
- i.e. which is available at the beginning of period t. In equations [2]-[4] two
cash flow variables are included, representing cash flow for sub-samples based
on size, age and relatedness to a Grupo. For example, in equation [2] one cash
flow variable is obtained by multiplying one period lagged cash flow with a
dummy variable, which is one when observations refer to small firms and zero
when they refer to large firms (CFSML). The other variable is obtained by
multiplying one period lagged cash flow with a dummy variable, which is one
when observations refer to large firms and zero when they refer to small firms
(CFLRG). The same procedure has been applied to create cash flow variables for
sub-samples based on age (CFYNG and CFOLD, respectively) and relatedness to
a Grupo (CFG and CFNG). All equations have been estimated including year
13 Several studies have followed this procedure. See, among others, Atiyas (1992); Fazzari,
Hubbard and Petersen (1988); and Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990).
14 The results for the cash flow variables presented in the tables below remained unchanged
when using the debt to capital ratio and/or Tobin’s Q of the current period, instead of lagged
variables. These results were also not affected when equations were estimated incorporating only
the sales variable or Tobin’s Q, next to the debt to capital ratio, investment one period lagged and
the cash flow variables.
20dummies to capture the impact of macroeconomic changes during the 1983-1992
period.
5.3 Discussion of the Results
The estimation results of the investment equations are presented in table 2.
Equation [1] presents the outcomes for the total sample of firms. Equations [2]
to [4] present the outcomes for the sub-samples of firms based on size, age and
relatedness to a Grupo, respectively. For all equations the results are similar with
respect to all regressors included except for cash flow. First, the results show
that the accelerator model is always satisfied, since the sales variable appears
with a strongly significant positive coefficient in all equations. Second,
investment one period lagged also appears with the expected sign and is strongly
significant. Third, the debt to capital ratio appears not to be statistically
significantly related to investment in any of the equations.
Turning to cash flow, the variable which is of particular interest in the
present analysis, the table shows that cash flow variables for all firms, as well as
for different sub-samples of firms appear with the expected sign in the
investment equations and are strongly significant.
The outcomes for the different sub-samples are as follows. For the sub-
samples based on size, the outcomes reveal that the coefficient for cash flow of
large firms is higher than that for small firms (0.145 against 0.12). Note,
however, that the difference between the value of both coefficients appears not
to be statistically significant. The cash flow coefficient of young firms is
significantly higher than that of old firms (0.21 against 0.11), suggesting that
young firms are confronted with more severe financial constraints due to
information problems in capital markets. This difference in values of coefficients
appears to be statistically significant. Finally, the coefficient of the non-Grupo
firms is higher than that for Grupo firms (0.145 and 0.12, respectively). Yet, the
difference between the levels of both coefficients appears not to be statistically
significant.
The outcomes of the estimations for the entire 1983-1992 period are of less
importance to the present study, since the financial reforms of the first half of
21the 1980s are hypothesised to have had a significant impact on investment
behaviour and its finance for different groups of firms. To test this hypothesis
the investment equations in table 2 are re-estimated. Each of the equations [2] to
[4] now includes four, instead of two cash flow variables. Again taking equation
[2] as an example, there are two cash flow variables for the small firms and two
for large firms. The cash flow variable for small firms is multiplied with a
dummy variable, which is one when observations refer to the 1983-1987 period
and zero when they refer to the 1988-1992 period (CFSML PRE). Moreover, the
cash flow variable for small firms is multiplied with a dummy variable, which is
one when observations refer to the 1988-1992 period and zero when they refer to
the 1983-1987 period (CFSML POST). The same procedure has been followed
to construct the two cash flow variables for large firms (CFLRG PRE and
CFLRG POST, respectively), as well as for the other sub-samples (CFYNG PRE
and POST, CFOLD PRE and POST, CFG PRE and POST, and CFNG PRE and
POST, respectively).
The outcomes of the estimations reveal the following. For the full sample of
firms, the cash flow coefficient drops from the pre-reform to the post-reform
period, but this drop is only small, suggesting that on average the reform may
not have changed investment and its finance very much. More information on
this issue can be obtained when looking at sub-samples of firms, however.
First, for the sub-samples based on size the outcomes suggest that the cash
flow coefficient for large firms is 0.14 and that it does not change after the
implementation of the reforms. The coefficient for small firms does change,
however, from 0.13 to 0.115. Differences between coefficients of both sub-
samples, as well as sub-periods appear not to be statistically significant. This
result suggests that when taking size as the criterion to divide firms into groups
which differ with respect to the extent of information problems they are
confronted with, no evidence is found for the hypothesis that the financial
reforms in Chile did reduce information problems for the informationally
disadvantaged small firms during the second half of the 1980s.
Second, for the sub-samples based on age the outcomes show that before the
reforms cash flow was a significantly more important determinant of investment
22for young firms (coefficient is 0.20) than for old firms (coefficient is 0.12). After
the reforms, this outcome remains unchanged; the difference between the cash
flow coefficients appears to become even somewhat larger (0.09 and 0.21,
respectively). This suggests that, contrary to what is hypothesised, the reforms
do not seem to have the expected impact on reducing market imperfections for
the informationally disadvantaged young firms.
Finally, when looking at sub-samples based on the relatedness to a Grupo
the estimation outcomes suggest the following. Before the reforms, internal
sources of finance are a more important determinant of investment for non-
Grupo firms as compared to Grupo firms (coefficients are 0.19 and 0.11,
respectively). However, after the reforms there appears to be no significant
difference between coefficients of cash flow (0.13 and 0.12, respectively), i.e.
internal sources are equally important in determining investment of both Grupo
and non-Grupo firms. This result suggests that, based on the criterion of whether
or not firms have relationships to Grupos, informationally disadvantaged firms
(i.e. firms without Grupo relations) were indeed confronted with more severe
financial constraints based on exisiting information problems in capital markets,
whereas after the reforms were implemented financial constraints did no longer
differ. This may support the hypothesis that the financial reforms have been
effective in reducing market imperfections in financial markets related to
information problems.
The latter result may be interpreted as follows. As has been discussed
elsewhere (Hermes and Lensink, 1996), one of the specific characteristics of the
changes in regulation during the early 1980s was directed towards reducing the
possibilities of intra-Grupo lending. This change of regulation may be part of the
explanation for the results found and presented in table 3, equation [4]. The new
regulation adversely affected the opportunities of banks being the financial heart
of the Grupos. This may have also reduced the information advantages they had
with respect to lending to Grupo firms as compared to non-Grupo firms before
the restrictions on intra-Grupo lending were effectuated. Indeed, this regulatory
change may have reduced the mitigating effect of conglomerate structures on the
information problems in capital markets. Stated somewhat differently, it may
23have helped to reduce the existing market segmentation in these markets based
on such structures.
Table 2: Econometric Results of the Investment Equations
[1] [2] [3] [4]
CF (-1) 0.131 (4.65)
CFLRG (-1) 0.144 (3.69)
CFSML (-1) 0.121 (3.38)
CFOLD (-1) 0.107 (3.28)
CFYNG (-1) 0.206 (4.05)
CFG (-1) 0.119 (3.23)
CFNG (-1) 0.144 (3.79)
TOBQ (-1) 0.059 (2.02) 0.057 (1.95) 0.061 (2.16) 0.058 (1.98)
DEBT (-1) -0.043 (-1.52) -0.043 (-1.52) -0.045 (-1.16) -0.043 (-1.52)
D SAL 0.212 (3.69) 0.213 (4.46) 0.219 (4.05) 0.214 (3.72)
GINV (-1) 0.306 (6.41) 0.307 (6.43) 0.300 (6.30) 0.303 (6.35)
R
2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
adj. R
2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
N 472 472 472 472
Notes:
The independent variable is gross investment. For explanation of the abbreviations used, see the main
text. All equations have been estimated with year dummies. Only dummies for 1988 and 1992
appeared to be significant. The estimations shown in the table include only these two dummies. They
have been omitted from the table for presentation purposes. Estimations including all year dummies
do not differ substantially from those presented in the table.
t-statistics and R
2 have been corrected for the loss of degrees of freedom due to the inclusion of firm
specific dummies. Adjusted t-values (between parentheses) and R
2 are presented in the table.
Estimations have been tested on the condition of normally distributed residuals, using the Jarque-Bera
test statistic (JB). This test is chi-squared distributed with two degrees of freedom and should always
be lower than 5.99 to be significant at the five per cent level. For all regressions presented in this
table the test results show that the hypothesis of normally distributed residuals can be accepted at the
five per cent level of significance. The White test is applied to test for problems of heteroscedasticity
of residuals. In almost all cases the hypothesis of no problems of heteroscedasticity could be
excepted at the one per cent level of significance. This indicates that there might still remain some
minor problems with respect to heteroscedasticity.
24Table 3: Econometric Results of the Investment Equations: Pre- and Post Reform
[1] [2] [3] [4]
all firms:
CF (-1) PRE 0.136 (3.58)
CF (-1) POST 0.126 (3.22)
large firms:
CFLRG (-1) PRE 0.143 (2.80)
CFLRG (-1) POST 0.144 (2.60)
small firms:
CFSML (-1) PRE 0.130 (2.39)
CFSML (-1) POST 0.115 (2.58)
old firms:
CFOLD (-1) PRE 0.120 (2.91)
CFOLD (-1) POST 0.093 (2.20)
young firms:
CFYNG (-1) PRE 0.197 (2.39)
CFYNG (-1) POST 0.211 (3.24)
Grupo firms:
CFG (-1) PRE 0.109 (2.33)
CFG (-1) POST 0.133 (2.45)
non-Grupo firms:
CFNG (-1) PRE 0.186 (3.00)
CFNG (-1) POST 0.123 (2.69)
TOBQ (-1) 0.059 (2.01) 0.057 (1.94) 0.062 (2.12) 0.059 (2.07)
DEBT (-1) -0.043 (-1.58) -0.043 (-1.52) -0.045 (-1.60) -0.042 (-1.49)
D SAL 0.211 (3.67) 0.212 (3.90) 0.062 (3.83) 0.213 (3.70)
GINV (-1) 0.306 (6.41) 0.307 (6.41) 0.301 (6.31) 0.301 (6.57)
R
2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.26
adj. R
2 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.12
N 472 472 472 472
Notes: see table 2.
256. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has investigated whether the financial reforms, which have been
implemented in Chile during the first half of the 1980s, have contributed to
reducing market imperfections in capital markets in the late 1980s and early
1990s. The outcomes of the econometric analysis have shown that the supportive
evidence for the hypothesis that financial reforms have contributed to reducing
market imperfections in capital markets is not very strong. The outcomes of
estimations based on two out of three sub-samples do not show the expected
drop of the coefficient of cash flow for informationally disadvantaged firms after
the reforms had been implemented. In the case where firms have been divided
according to their relatedness to a Grupo, however, is there a drop of the cash
flow coefficient of non-Grupo firms, and do the coefficients of Grupo and non-
Grupo firms converge, indicating a reduction of information problems in capital
markets related to the issue of financial networks between firms and banks. The
importance of such networks in mitigating information problems appears to have
been diminished after the implementation of the reforms. Or, in other words, the
apparent market segmentation in capital markets based on the relatedness to a
Grupo has decreased in the second half of the 1980s. This lends support to the
idea that those changes in regulation, which were introduced exactly to reduce
the dominant role of Grupos in financial markets, - and implemented mainly
during 1981-1982 - appear to have been effective.
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